A SHORT HISTORY OF THE HUMP

This document was written by Lt. Col. Arthur W. Sutton, Jr., USAF (Ret.). Colonel Sutton flew the hump from Dec. 1943 to Dec. 1944, completing 86 round trips in C-46's. His history is based on personal recollections and his log books. It is not intended to be all inclusive but provides a succinct background of the operation and why it existed.

A Short History of the Hump

In February, 1942, General H. H. Arnold advised President Roosevelt that an air route to China should be developed. The President agreed and a preliminary start of flying the route that later came to be known as THE HUMP was begun. In April, 1942, the last ground connection between China and the Allies was cut with the capture of the Burma Road in upper Burma by the Japanese. The first to fly "The Hump" was the Chinese National Aviation Company (CNAC), a jointly owned Chinese and American Airline operation. Soon to join the effort was the newly formed 10th Air Force under Major General Louis Brereton. Problems developed very quickly as Gen. Brereton believed that all Air operations should be under a single command and should be used as the Theater commander thought best. General Robert Olds, of the Air Corp Ferrying Command argued that such an arrangement would result in transports being diverted to other combat uses. The dispute over control stemmed from a long standing policy in the Armed Forces that a Theater commander had control of everything in his theater, even those in transit. Thus, a large part of what was originally destined for China was diverted to other use as Brereton concluded that they were more urgently needed elsewhere. The Air Ferrying Command argued that under this system it would be unable to carry out it functions. In July, 1942, the Air Ferrying Command was renamed the Air Transport Command (ATC), commanded by General Harold George with General C. R. Smith as his deputy. The concept of a centralized strategic transport service directed from the War Department in Washington was accepted, enabling the ATC to pursue its mission in close cooperation but independent of various theater commanders.

After the fall of Lashio and the closing of the Burma Road, the Japanese continued their march into northern Burma and captured the town of Myitkina and it's air bases. This forced the air route to China from India to move to the far north where the mountains reached above 20,000 feet. Unfortunately, the backbone plane, at that time the C-47, could not effectively reach these altitudes. This left only the C-87/109, which was a converted model of the B-24 heavy bomber, capable of flying the Hump until the introduction of the C-46. The C-46, with a much higher load capacity and more powerful engines, though new and untried and afflicted with very serious maintenance problems, became the real workhorse of the Hump operation.

Brigadier General Earl Hoag assumed command of the India-China Wing of the ATC in October, 1943, and placed Colonel (later BG) Tom Hardin in command of the Hump operations. Colonel Hardin, a hard driving ex air line executive, immediately set out to increase tonnage over the Hump. One of Colonel Hardin's first orders decreed, "Effective immediately, there will be no more weather over the Hump", which meant that pilots were to take a bolder attitude toward weather and were not to cancel flights because of storms. Another order forbade the canceling of flights because of report of enemy planes.

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BG Tom Hardin

Colonel Hardin also instituted night flying saying that crews have to rest, but planes don't and from then on the Hump operation was a twenty four hour a day operation. These and other orders were costly in terms of planes and crews. In the month following the edict regarding enemy action, prowling Japanese planes shot down six transports on October 13th, and on October 23d another five planes were lost to enemy fighters. Between June and December, 1943, the Hump route suffered the loss of 135 aircraft and 168 airmen to enemy fighters, weather, and terrain.

Another thing that added to the problems on the Hump was the practice of the Air Force in sending a large number of totally inexperienced replacement pilots to the ATC bases in India. Many of these men were sent directly from flying school to serve as co-pilots on the Hump. Many times their first flight over the Hump was the first time that they had ever been in the type of aircraft they were assigned to. They arrived with no advanced instrument flying training and were likely to make several trips over the Hump before they even saw the mountains that they were flying over. Before take off the pilot would have to instruct them in such rudimentary procedures as the raising and lowering of the landing gear and adjusting the flaps. This, of course, greatly increased the stress that the pilot was normally under and probably added to the accident and casualty rate.

At the August Trident conference between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill and the Allied Joint Chiefs of Staff, General WebMania! George Stratemeyer was appointed Theater Commander. His appointment contained so many restrictions, though, that his was mostly an advisory role. General Stratemeyer appointed a Board of Officers to study how to increase tonnage over the Hump. They reached the obvious conclusion that what was needed was more resources and planes for the ATC. Until this time, all Hump flights originated in Assam. Under General Statemeyer's direction, three new aerodromes were opened in east Bengal and delivery and service of aircraft to the ATC was improved.

In March, 1944, the Japanese launched a major drive to cut off Assam and occupy Imphal. This would have completely cut off the Hump operation. By the end of the month, the Japanese had surrounded Imphal and Kohima and had driven to within thirty miles of cutting the railroad to Assam. The supply of Imphal and Kohima was primarily a troop carrier operation, but thirty-five planes and crews had to be borrowed from the ATC to assist in the direct defense of the region. Hardin, now a BG, estimated that these diversions cost the hump deliveries 2,500 tons. Also, in April, the ATC was called upon to transport 18,000 troops of the Chinese 50th division from Yunnan China to Sookerating in the Assam valley. This action reduced the airlift by another 1,500 tons. The loss of this tonnage was reported directly to Washington by General Hardin as the tonnage rate had become almost a fetish with the command in Washington, and the sole measure of the Wing's accomplishment.

In April, 1944, in China, the Japanese launched their largest land offensive of the war, code named "Ichigo" with 650,000 troops. The goal was to take the American bases at Kweilin and Liuchow and then drive up the Yangtze valley and take Chungking and Kunming. The fall of Chungking would have effectively taken China out of the war. Once again, ATC planes were diverted from their primary job and used to evacuate American personnel and equipment in the face of the Japanese onslaught, and to re-supply the Chinese troops fighting to stop the Japanese advance. Also, the ATC was called upon to supply two squadrons to return the Chinese 14th and 22nd divisions from Burma to China to assist in stopping the Japanese. With the aid of these troops, the drive to capture Chungking and Kunming was stopped and the Japanese began to withdraw. Concurrent with the supply of the Burma campaign, the regular Hump operations, and the crisis caused by Ichigo, the ATC had a further burden imposed upon it. This was Project Matterhorn which brought the new and untried American super bomber - B-29 - to the CBI theater. In February, 1944, the ATC was ordered to deliver 2,275 tons to the B-29 bases in Chengtu; in March, 3,602 tons were delivered to the B-29's. By the end of the year, over 30,000 tons had been flown over the Hump for the B-29's. In addition, 4,375 tons were absorbed by the 312th Fighter Group who's sole task was to defend the B-29 bases at Chengtu.

In May, 1944, Stilwell's American and Chinese forces recaptured the airfield at Myitkina, though the town was not taken until August. Once again, ATC planes were diverted from their main task. On May 18th, ATC planes flew 2,500 combat engineers, their tractors, bulldozers, and other equipment into Myitkyina. The capture of Myitkyina, and a little later Bamo, opened the way to flying the Hump at a much lower altitude and eliminated the problem of enemy fighters.

In September, 1944, after two years of very arduous duty in North Africa and the CBI, General Hardin was relieved and replaced by Brigadier General William Tunner of the ATC Ferrying Division. While commanding, General Hardin increased tonnage from 4,624 in September 1943, to 23,675 in August 1944. As supply became more available, General Tunner increased the number of planes and personnel from 249 planes and 17,032 men to 332 planes and 22,359 men by July, 1945. With withdrawl of the B-29's from the theater, the ATC acquired new bases in east Bengal to operate from. To increase efficiency, General Tunner introduced production line maintenance and was able to install more powerful and more reliable radio navigational aids. Even using the southern and lower altitude routes, the Hump still exacted a terrible toll on men and planes. The period January-March, 1945 saw seventy-seven major accidents and 134 fatalities. This brought on a drive for flying safety. With the new maintenance procedure, increased flying safety and introduction of the C-54, tonnage was increased dramatically. The Hump reached it's peak in the summer of 1945. The India-China division of the ATC at that time operated 330 C-46's, 167 C-47's, and 132 C-54's and C-87/109's. The regular lift over the Hump was 58,000 tons in June and reached its highest point of 71,042 tons in July. The end of the war brought a swift decline in the Hump operation with flying safety taking precedence over tonnage.

The Hump went through three phases; first under Bissel, Alexander, and Naiden. Bissell, who had once been Stilwell's Air Advisor, along with Stilwell never fully realized the potential of air lift and did not fully push for necessary supplies, planes and men. Second; under the driving force of Tom Hardin, the Hump operation changed from one of limited possibilities to one of dynamic growth and potential. Third; under William Tunner, the Hump experienced unlimited growth and productivity, thus bringing the airlift to it's final achievement.

Probably the greatest achievement of the Hump operation was the immobilization of a large part of the Japanese military. Japan had 2.3 million men overseas at the wars end. Of these, 1.2 million were tied down in China. The denial of these troops for use elsewhere in the Pacific, without a doubt, hastened the movement of the American forces in the Pacific and saved the lives of countless American Soldiers and Marines.

It was the experience gathered on the Hump that later led to the successful breaking of the Berlin blockade by airlift. Today, starting from an almost barnstorming type of operation over the Hump, the "Air Mobility Command" has the ability to transport thousands of tons of material and men to any part of the world in a matter of days, if not hours. It was the flying of the Hump that established AIRLIFT as a key factor in Military planning.

Two things that should be pointed out is that the British never fully cooperated and approved of the Hump operation. This, of course, caused considerable conflict in the effort. Another obstacle was the fact that from the beginning, and continuing throughout the war, the China-Burma-India Theater was given the very lowest priority to receive supplies and equipment of any theater.

In this very abbreviated and incomplete history of the "HUMP", I have relied very heavily on several books, mostly OVER THE "HUMP", AIRLIFT TO CHINA by William Koenig, and my own memory and logs.

Arthur W. Sutton, Jr.

LTC USAF Ret.